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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the surviving widows and 
children of two men killed at Flaming Gorge Dam 
to recover damages for the wrongful deaths of said 
decedents by reason of negligence and breach of war-
ranty of the defendallt-lessor of a motor crane. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The matter, after trial, was submitted to the jury 
on special verdict and special interrogatories. The jury 
found the defendant negligent in supplying a defectire 
crane, but that said negligence was not the proximate 
cause of the accident. The jury also found the decedents' 
employer negligent in failing to discover the defect and 
that said negligence was a proximate cause of the acci· 
dent. The jury also found the amount of damages. 
Plaintiffs thereupon moved for entry of judgment. 
which motion was denied, and the court entered judg· 
ment in favor of the defendant, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and judg· 
ment in their favor as a matter of law, or that failing, 
a new trial. 
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STATEIVIENT OF FACTS 
On IVIarch 29, 1963, Fortunat LeBouthillier, age 
30, and Frank T. Oliver, age 45, were working at the 
Flaming Gorge Dam site, both employed by Arch 
Dam Constructors, a joint venture consisting of Peter 
Kiewit & Sons, Morrison-Knudson, Inc., and .Mid-
y alley, Inc. ( R. 48). LeBouthillier was an iron worker, 
and Oli,·er worked as an oiler-an assistant to a crane 
operator. Arch Dam Constructors had leased on IV1arch 
29, 1963-the day of the accident-a thirty-five ton 
Lorain motor crane from the defendant, Shurtleff & 
Andrews, Inc., for the purpose of moving a trash gate 
on top of the dam, in order that the permanently in-
stalled gantry crane could travel across the dam. (R. 
183, 321). The crane, per the direction of the Arch 
Dam Superintendent Conrad Carlberg, was driven 
onto the dam from its parked position off the dam 
by one Gerald Twitchell, an Arch Dam employee, 
and maneuvered into position to lift the trash gate. 
(R. 191). Twitchell, with the assistance of the iron 
workers, hooked onto the load, lifted it a few inches 
off the ground, rotated the load a few feet to his left, 
and set the load down. ( R. 240-243) . The iron workers 
then took in the outriggers, which are devices for sta-
bilizing the crane during the lift. ( R. 196, 266) . Twitch-
ell then was doing absolutely nothing. (R. 206, 267). 
A matter of minutes elapsed when suddenly the jib 
portion of the crane (a gooseneck extension of the 
boom) came back to a position nearly ~in line with the 
boom and fell off to the right of the boom and upon 
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LeBouthillier and Oliver, killing them. ( R. 194, 207, 
246, 247, 516). l1ffestigation immediately after the 
accident disclosed that the connection between the jib 
and the boom was rusty, broken, elongated, worn and 
defective. (R. 199, 358, 361, Ex. 31, 32, 35). This 
portion (often referred to as the male end of the jib) 
when the jib is assembled to the boom is hidden by the 
portion of the boom often referred to as the female 
ears. (R. 521, 221, 285). The jib was assembled to 
the boom by one Holmes and one Pilling with the 
assistance of the Arch Dam iron workers in February 
of 1963, (R. 277) and used thereafter under separate 
leases by Oberg Electric and Arch Dam prior to its 
lease on March 29, 1963. (R. 319). Both Holmes and 
Pilling were long time Shurtleff & Andrews employees 
who went out to the Arch Dam site with Shurtleff 
& Andrews equipment by the direction of Shurtleff 
& Andrews and returned to Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 
after the equipment returned. During the time they 
were at Arch Dam, they often were on the Arch Dam 
payroll or the payroll of some other contractor, but 
their prime function was to maintain and care for and 
operate the Shurtleff & Andrews equipment. (R. 274, 
275, 292, 293). 
The weather at the time of the accident was windy 
and gusty, a condition often occurring at the Arch 
Dam job site. (R. 367, 212). The wind tended to 
funnel upstream, and in the position the crane was 
located at the time of the accident would tend to strike 
the left side of the jib. (R. 212). 
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Uncontroverted expert testimony demonstrated 
that the mechanics and metallurgy of the jib and boom 
and the connections referred to were such that a gust 
of wind striking the left side of the jib would cause 
the male end with the rusty, broken defect to fail, and 
cause the jib to come backwards and fall off to the 
right side of the boom, and that the cause of the jib 
falling 'ms the rusty, worn, elongated, broken, de-
fecti,·e jib made connection. (R. 190, 191, 409, 410, 
421, -122). Every witness who was asked, including 
those of the defendant, without exception testified that 
although they had seen jibs come back before, no wit-
ness had ever seen a jib fall to the ground before. (R. 
231, 306, 348, 349, 504). The defendant admitted that 
the elongation in ,the male connections were abnormal 
and a warning sign of wear, and it would not have 
installed the jib if it had known of the elongation. (R. 
325, 326). The defendant further admitted that it had 
not inspected the crane since it was supplied to the 
dam site in July, 1962, eight months prior to the acci-
dent (R. 322, 323), and during that period it had been 
leased by defendant to Oberg Electric in October of 
1962, Y\Titt Construction in November of 1962, Shirley, 
Gunther & Lane in November of 1962, Donovan Elec-
tric at Yernal in December of 1962, Arch Dam from 
January 16 to February 18, 1963, Oberg Electric on 
.March 13 and 14, 1963, and Arch Dam on March 
20 to l\Iarch 26, 1963. (R. 317-319). Between said 
leases, it remained idle at the dam site available from 
Shurtleff & Andrews for further leases. (R. 318). 
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In addition to its contentions that it was free from 
negligence proximately causing the deaths, defendant 
asserted by way of third party claim that Arch Dam 
Constructors failed, under the lease, to observe the 
defect and take proper precautions and that, therefore, 
Arch Dam must indemnify defendant for any award 
against defendant. 
The third party defendant, Arch Dam Construc-
tors, was thereafter joined in the lawsuit on the theory 
of indemnity over plaintiffs' objection. Plaintiffs there-
after moved that their causes be tried separately from 
the third party claim, which motion was denied. The 
trial required a full week-including the testimony of 
many eye witnesses and numerous experts. 
Evidence with respect to the plaintiffs' damages 
showed without dispute that LeBouthillier had a life 
expectancy of 40.98 years, and that the loss of support 
by his widow and four children, discounted at four 
and one-half percent over his life expectancy, was as 
much as $123,000.00. (Ex. 54, 55, R. 279). That he 
was an excellent workman, a man who would be sought 
for on iron worker jobs ( R. 270, 271) , of good health. 
a loving and devoted father and husband, and that the 
plaintiffs suffered a substantial loss of society, com· 
fort, care and protection. ( R. 438-440) . The evidence 
without dispute showed that Mr. Oliver had a life ex· 
pectancy of 27.34 years, and that Mrs. Oliver's loss 
of support, discounted at four and one-half percent, 
was as much as $56,650.00. (Ex. 54, 56, R. 279). 
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That l\frs. Oliver, after a seventeen year marriage, 
suffered substantial loss of society, comfort, care, and 
protection. ( R. 429-431). 
The matter was submitted to the jury on a special 
yerdict and special interrogatories, and after over four 
hours of deliberation, the jury made findings as fol-
lows (R. 88, 89): 
"I. 'Vas the accident in question an unavoid-
able accident, as that has been defined for you 
in these instructions? 
Answer: No. 
2. 'Vas the defendant, Shurtleff & Andrews, 
negligent in the following situation: 
(a) In failing to exercise that degree of 
care which a reasonably prudent lessor 
of a crane would do under all of the 
circumstances of this case prior to its 
delivery to the lessee, to inspect the 
crane for any defects which might be 
so discovered and to repair the same 
before delivering it to the lessee, Arch 
Dam Constructors, so that it would be 
safe to use by and around its em-
ployees? 
Answer: Yes. 
If your answer is YES then answer the fol-
lowing: Was such negligence of the defendant 
Shurtleff & Andrews a proximate cause of the 
accident? 
Answer: No. 
3. 'Vas it the reasonable intendment of the 
parties that the obligation to repair found in 
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paragraph 7 of the lease (Exhibit D-27) should 
include an obligation of the lessee, Arch Dam 
Constructors, to exercise such care as a reason-
ably prudent lessee of a crane would do under 
all of the circumstances of this case to remove 
the jib from the boom to inspect the 'ears' at 
such time or times as may have been necessary 
to make any needed repairs? · 
Answer: Yes. 
If your answer to the foregoing question is 
YES then answer the following: 
(a) Did the Arch Dam Constructors fail 
to exercise the duty so undertaken by 
them under the agreement? · 
Answer: Yes. 
If your answer to (a) is YES then answer 
the following : 
(b) Was such failure a proximate cause of 
the accident? 
Answer: Yes. 
4. vVhat amount of damages do you find, if 
any, that would reasonably compensate Gloria 
Oliver for the loss she has sustained? 
$68,000.00 
5. What amount of damages do you find, if 
any, that would reasonably compensate Marielle 
LeBouthiellier and the children for the loss they 
have sustained? 
$150,000.00" 
Plaintiffs then moved for entry of judgment, which 
motion was denied (R. 149, 150, 158, 159), and judg· 
ment was entered upon the special interrogatories in 
8 




THE .ANS,VERS OF THE JURY TO THE 
SPECIAL INTERHOGATORIES ENTITLE 
PLAINTIFFS TO JUDG.MENT AS A :MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
The jury, in answering the special verdict and 
special interrogatories, found the following: 
(a) That defendant Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 
was negligent in failing to inspect, discover and repair 
the defective crane. 
(b) That such negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the accident. 
( c) That Arch Dam failed to inspect, discover and 
repair the defect. 
( d) That such negligence of Arch Dam was a 
proximate cause of the accident. 
( e) That l\irs. Oliver was damaged in the sum 
of $68,000.00 and Mrs. LeBouthillier and her children 
were damaged in the sum of $150,000.00. 
From the finding that Arch Dam failed to inspect, 
discover and repair the defect, which was a proximate 
cause of the accident, the court must conclude as a 
matter of law that the defendant Shurtleff ~ Andrews' 
9 
failure to inspect, discover and repair the defect 'WG.8 
a proximate cause of the accident. 
Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah no, 138 P.2d 639, 
controls the issue of causation. There, one Babcock , 
a fellow servant of the plaintiffs, not only failed to 
observe or inspect or discover with respect to a defective 
and negligently furnished and maintained boiler, but 
in fact stoked the fire, operated the boiler and other-
wise contributed to the resulting explosion. The de-
fendant contended that the conduct of Babcock was 
an efficient independent intervening cause which, as 
a matter of law, was the sole cause of the explosion. This 
court held: 
"This contention is not tenable. The conduct 
of Babcock * * * in neglecting to attend to the 
water in the boiler was simply a continuation of 
the conduct of the predecessor crew. It was an 
added and continued negligence of the same type 
and not an independent nor an intervening cause. 
The whole conduct of predecessor and successor 
crews was of a piece. An independent interven-
ing cause such as to break the causal connection 
between right and wrong according to Bohlen 
on Torts, page 29, must be ( 1) independent, 
self created, not itself the product of the wrong-
ful act; ( 2) it must intervene; ( 3) it must divert 
and not merely hasten natural effect of the 
wrong." (Emphasis added). 
* * * * 
"The concurrent or succeeding negligence of 
a fellow servant· or a third person which does 
not break the sequence of events is not such a 
10 
cause and constitutes no defense for the original 
wrongdoer, although in the absence of the con-
current or succeeding negligence, the accident 
would not have happened." 
Therefore, if Arch Dam's failure to discover the 
defect was a proJ}imate cause of the accident, the defect, 
supplied by Shurtleff ~ Andrews, was a proximate 
cause of the accident. 
Our law is clear that when the facts are submitted 
on special interrogatories, the court shall enter judg-
ment after applying appropriate legal conclusions to 
the facts as found. In Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., 
8 Ctah :2d 383, 335 P.2d 619, the jury answered special 
interrogatories as follows: (a) Defendant was negli-
gent in allowing ice to form on the sidewalk; ( b) De-
fendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the 
accident; ( c) Plaintiff was negligent in walking on 
the ice; ( d) Plaintiff's negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the accident. This court held that under the 
circumstances, the question of proximate cause was 
a legal one and the only inference permissible was that 
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the 
accident and affirmed the trial court's entry of judg-
ment in favor of defendant despite the jury's answers 
with respect to causation. See also Schweitzer v. Stone, 
13 Utah 2d 199, 371 P.2d 201, where the jury in answer 
to special interrogatories found that one Stone was 
negligent in failing to have lights or flares on his stalled 
truck and that such negligence was a proximate cause 
of the accident, and that one Sheffy was negligent in 
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assisting Stone with respect to his stalled truck when 
there were no lights or flares on the truck but that his 
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. 
This court held that the conduct of both Sheffy and 
Stone was of the .Yame type and of a piece and that there 
was no basis as a matter of law for distinguishing be-
tween the two parties' negligence with respect to caus· 
ation. 
The jury's answer herein with respect to the de· 
fendant's causation clearly results by reason of the 
trial court's directing the jury to answer said inter-
rogatory as they did. By the court's instruction No. 24, 
the jury was directed: 
"If you find the joint connecting the jib to 
the boom was defective when the crane was leased 
to Arch Dam which constituted negligence on 
the part of Shurtleff & Andrews, and if you 
further find that upon receiving possession of 
the crane, or thereafter during its use, Arch Dam 
knew or should have known of said defect, if 
any, and the danger involved in continuing the 
use of said crane in such a defective condition, 
such conduct of Arch Dam would be the efficient 
intervening cause and not the proximate cause 
of the accident and plaintiffs' resulting damage, 
and Shurtleff & Andrews may not be held re· 
sponsible." (Emphasis supplied). 
The jury had no alternative, having found that the 
employer, Arch Dam, failed to discover the defect and 
that it had a duty to do so under the lease, but to find 
that "Shurtleff & Andrews may not be held respon· 
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sible" even though they negligently supplied a def ectiYe 
crane. The instruction is erroneous. 
It is universally recognized that actual knowledge 
of a hazardous condition by a third person under a 
duty to take appropriate corrective measures will con-
stitute such person's failure so to do an efficient inter-
yening cause because it is not reasonably foreseeable 
that a person having actual knowledge will fail to act. 
On the other hand, it is well recognized that where a 
third person not having actual knowledge fails to dis-
cover the hazard and take intervening precautions which 
he was legally bound to take, that such omission does 
not constitute an efficient superseding cause, but is 
concurring only with the act or omission of the original 
tort feasor. Harper & James, Law of Torts, Vol. 2, 
§ 20.5, p. 1146, N. 42. The Supreme Court of Utah 
recognized this well established principle in the case of 
Ehalt v. McCarthy, supra. 
No case in this jurisdiction holds that a third 
party's failure to discover a defect constitutes an inde-
pendent intervening cause as a matter of law. The 
distinction between the two situations noted above, i.e. 
actual knowledge on the one hand and failure to dis-
cover on the other, is recognized in this jurisdiction 
under the Ehalt case, supra, and the case of Toma v. 
Ctah Power & Light Company, 12 Utah 2d 278, 365 
P.2d 788, wherein it was held that the employer's actual 
knowledge of the danger and continued exposure of 
the workmen to the danger despite said actual knowl-
edge constituted an efficient independent intervening 
13 
l'atl,l'. Tiit' .lid 0 11rtl1_11 l'a,t·, "upra. l'o11trari" i~t· l111ld, 
a' a 111attn of la\\ tl1at "lit rt· thl' third party fail-. 1, 
oli,t·nt· lilt' dall•'l'r, tl1l' l\\11 t·1111dt1d' arl' l'Olll'1JITi11ir ,.... l"o' 
Thi, l'<>llrt has al-..11 l1cld i11 a line of a11to11wh1i1 
al'('idl'llt l'a't'' that wht·n· a lakr ador ()/J.l(('ITl's .,, 
l"irn1111,ta11n·, arl' ,w·h that Ill' cu11 //()/ f"il tu (J/1.~a;, 
tht· defr11da11t·, lll'gligl"11lly lTl'ated danger. hut m·rn-
thdt·" faill'd to avoid it. the latter ador·, t·1111d11r: 
t•o11:-.tit11tt·:-. :111 l'ffit·il'nt i11dt·pt·111le11t i11tern·11i11g l'a11,, 
as a mattt·r of law. Sn· llill.'lurd i". l'talt ll.11-l'mduct) 
I l. tah :!d ua. :wa P.:!d :!8i. Sel' also JfrJ/ urdir : 
(',u/a1d1ud, H l"tah :!d 4-00, :J.j.li P.:M 711. and J'd11~· 
""''" t'. Grt·.11lwu11d Lint·.~. 1:.! ( "tah :!d :11u. at>ti P.:!d !l>\\I 
lrnll'l'd the mufoputed e\·ident·e is that once th1 
jili was assembled. that portio11 thereof containi11g tl11 
defect was completely hidden from ,·iew. The jury 
here. howen·r. expressly found that Arch Dam l'on· 
strudors failed to n·nwn· the jih from the hoom t,, 
iusped tht· ears awl aceordingly did not know of th1 
de fed nor were circumstances such that they could 
not lmH failed to obsene it. 
This court. in the llillwird case, supra. quote~ 
from the Hestateme11t of Torts. ~ 4-4-7, which state': 
"The fad tlmt an inten·ening ad of :1 third 
person is negligent in itself or is done in a negli· 
gent manner does not make it a s11persedi11i.: 
<'n11se of harm to another which the ador\ neg· 
ligent l'ond11d i:-. a s11h,tantial factor in hring· 
ing about. if: I a I The actor at the time of hi, 
negligent l'ondud should have realized that a 
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thml pt-rsn11 might so ad, or ( h I A reas1111ahle 
111:111. k11m' i11g thl' situation existi11g whe11 the 
ad of t ht: third person was done, would not rt·-
gard 1t as highly l'Xtraordirmry that the tl11rd 
pl'rson had '.'lo adt'd, or ( c) The intt·n·cning ad 
1.., a normal resp1111..,e tu a situation l'reakd hy the 
:1dnr·'.'i l'o11dul'l a11d the marmer in which it is 
do11e 1s 11ot extraordinarily 11eglige11t." 
1'11e lt·'.'it of fon·seeahility set forth in the Hestatt'-
1111·1;! of Torts i'.'i ad11pted in fJ'lwlt t' . .llcCarth.11. supra . 
. , 11t·1T this court states: 
.. Tiu.· i11dq>e11de11 t in tene11ing cause that " ill 
pren·nt a recon.'fy 1111 account of the act or omis-
sin11 of a wrongdot'f must he a cause which inter-
rnpts the natural se<l'1ence of e\'ents, turns aside 
their c·ourst', pren·nts the natural and probable 
result of the original act or omission, and pro-
duc.·es a different result that could not hm·c /Jccn 
rn1.w1lf1hl,11 a 11 I ici pa It'd." ( Emphasis supp lied.) 
St·e also Strandlwlm 1·. Gcnaal Construction Co., 
1 Ort'., I !lli:n. :J8:? P.:.!d 84-:J, where the plaintiff was 
i11.1urcd hy the eollapse of a marine boom. The hoom 
t·1illapsed lwc:rnse of a pin falling out of place, which 
p111 "as secured hy the use of a cotter key rather than 
a 1111t. The defense of the crane supplier was that the 
l'l•11d11d of the employer was an independent interve11-
111g ea use. The court stated. quoting from.Judge )fedina 
·11 f'rflfrricks 1·. A mericrm E.rport Lirtea ( 2d Cir., 
l!l.15 l . :?:?7 F .2d 450: 
"Could the jury here have properly found that 
tlw How of causation arising from the negligent 
fabrication by the defe11d:111t was broken hy the 
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employer's failure to discover the defect? That 
the intervening purchaser will remain passiYe 
or otherwise fail to do what he ought to do to 
prevent the course of events is a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of the original wrongdoing. 
Moreover, this is not a distinction based upon 
mere passivity, but rather upon whether or not 
the ultimate fact or occurrence is reasonably 
foreseeable. This is a far cry from the doing 
of something or of refraining from doing some-
thing constituting an improbable independent 
intervening cause which is a superseding cause 
and breaks the sequence." 
The American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts, 
§ 452, provides: 
"Third Person's Failure to Prevent Harm 
Failure of a third person to perform a duty 
owing to another to protect him from harm 
threatened by the actor's negligent conduct is 
not a superseding cause of the other's harm. 
Comment: 
a. The fact that the third person has failed to 
perform his duty to protect the other from harm 
threatened by the actor's negligence, implies that, 
had the duty been performed, it would have pre-
vented the actor's negligence from causing the 
harm which results from it. In order that there 
can be a failure of a duty of protection the person 
owing it must have either the opportunity to 
perform it or at least he should have had such 
an opportunity had he been reasonably attentive 
to his surroundings. The third person's failure 
to perform his duty in this respect makes him 
concurrently liable with the negligent actor for 
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any harm which results from the actor's negli-
gence and which would have been prevented by 
the performance of the third person's duty." 
See also § 425, Restatement of Torts, which provides: 
"One who employs an independent contractor 
to maintain in safe condition * * * (b) a chattel 
* * * he leases for immediate use is subject to the 
same liability for bodily harm caused by the con-
tractor's negligent failure to maintain the chattel 
in reasonably safe condition as though he had 
retained its maintenance in his own hands." 
lt will be recalled that the chattel was leased to Arch 
Dam and under the defendant's theory, Arch Dam 
had a duty to maintain the chattel. 
Granted that the defendant Shurtleff & Andrews 
also claimed that the conduct of the crane operator 
was an efficient intervening or superseding cause. It 
follows, however, as a matter of law, that the jury by 
finding the employer's failure to discover the defect 
was a proximate cau.Ye of the accident found that there 
was no superseding cause, which by law is the sole cause. 
The court properly instructed the jury by its instruc-
tion No. 13 following J.I.F.U. and Kawaguchi v. 
Bennett, ll2 Utah 442, 189 P.2d 109: 
"The proximate cause of an IIlJUry is that 
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, pro-
duces the injury, and without which the result 
would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause 
-the one that necessarily sets in operation the 
factors that accomplish the injury. 
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It may operate directly or through intermedi-
ate agencies or through conditions created by 
such agencies." 
The jury must be assumed to have followed this in-
struction, as it followed instruction No. 24, and ex-
pressly found no superseding cause. 
As indicated above, this court has adopted a line 
of cases dealing with automobile collisions commencing 
with the Hillyard case, supra, that if a latter actor's 
conduct is such that he could not fail to obsene the 
dangerous condition, it constitutes an efficient inde-
pendent intervening cause as a matter of law. It is 
interesting to note that this court adopted the language 
of and relied in large part upon the Pennsylvania auto-
mobile case of Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, 
Ill ALR 406. Accordingly, a search was made of 
Pennsylvania decisions in order to determine that 
court's view with respect to a fact situation more closely 
analygous to that of Ehalt v. McCarthy, supra, and 
the instant case, i.e. a case involving a defective chattel 
rather than a hazard created by moving vehicles. In 
the case of a seller or supplier of chattels, however, 
the Pennsylvania court is completely in accord with 
Ehalt v. McCarthy, supra, Strandholm v. General 
Construction, supra, and the Restatement of Torts. In 
Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., .... Pa. ____ , 68 
A.2d 517, where the defendant seller furnished a de-
fective gas tank and claimed that the plaintiff's em-
ployer was negligent in failing to inspect and test the 
tank and that the employer's negligence superseded 
the defendant's negligence, the court stated: 
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"'Vas defendant's negligence superseded by 
any independent, intervening cause? 
[18] Defendants claim that the failure of the 
East Ohio Gas Company to inspect the tank and 
make further tests of its safety constituted an 
independent act of negligence which superseded 
their own negligence. There is no merit in this 
contention. 'Vhether the East Ohio Gas Com-
pany was under a duty of making more adequate 
inspection and tests, or whether in view of its 
position as a gas operator and not a tank builder 
it could not have been expected to have the tech-
nical knowledge necessary to perform such a 
duty, might, if it were a defendant, be a question 
for the jury. But even if such a duty existed and 
the East Ohio Gas Company failed to perform 
it. that would not free defendants from blame, 
for any such shortcomings on the part of the 
East Ohio Gas Company would not constitute 
an intervening and superseding act of negligence. 
In Restatement, Torts, § 396, it is said that 'A 
manufacturer of a chattel is subject to liability 
under the rules stated in §§ 394 and 395, al-
though the dangerous character or condition of 
the chattel is discoverable by an inspection which 
any other person is under a duty to the person 
injured to make.' All academic authorities on 
the law of torts (Harper on Torts, ch. 7, p. 
248, § 106, Prosser on Torts, ch. 15, p. 687, 
§ 83; Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, ch. 
2, pp. 117, 118) agree that a manufacturer is 
not relieved of liability for the negligent con-
struction of an article which, in its defective con-
dition, menaces the safetv of others, merelv be-. . 
cause his immediate vendee or some other person 
through whose hands the article passes has the 
opportunity, or is even under a duty, of inspec-
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tion. This is because the failure of such vendee 
or other person to make an inspection is within 
the foreseeable risk of the manufacturer. It is 
said in Harper on Torts, ch. 7, p. 248, § 106: 
'A negligent defendant cannot escape liability 
because of a failure on the part of some third 
person to perf arm an affirmative duty which, 
if properly perfonned, would have enabled the 
plaintiff to avoid the rislc created by the de-
f endan ( s negliyence. The failure of the other 
to inspect adequately may make him liable to 
the party harmed, but it will not relieve the de-
fendant whose neyli,qence was responsible for 
the hazard in the first place.' This application 
of the general rule of proximate causation is 
recognized in Ohio. In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
Snyder, 55 Ohio St. 342, 359, 360, 45 N.E. 559, 
562, 60 Am. St. Rep. 700, one railroad company 
delivered to another for transportation a ca1 
which was defective and which it had not prop-
erly inspected and repaired; an employe of the 
latter company was injured while handling the 
car and it was held that the first company was 
responsible to him for damages. The court said 
that to relieve the first company from the con-
sequences of its negligence it was not enough 
that the act of the second company was nearest 
in the order of events to the injury nor that 
without it the injury would not have occurred; 
that it was not essential to the liability of the 
first company that its negligence should be the 
sole cause of the injury, but if the result was 
produced by the negligence of both companies, 
each contributing a necessary condition to the 
result, either, or both, might be held responsible 
at the election of the party injured; that neither 
could claim exoneration on account of the fault 
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of the other; that the negligence of the first com-
pany \vas undoubtedly the primary or proximate 
cause; that the most that could be claimed from 
the omission of the proper inspection by the 
second company was that it failed to cure or 
remove the previous negligence of the first com-
pany and thereby interrupt the consequences 
which were likely to, and did, flow from it; and 
that such failure could not with propriety be 
said to have broken the connection between the 
negligence of the first company and the mJury 
resulting from the use of the defective car or 
to have been the self-operating cause of the 
injury. In Szabo v. Tabor Ice Cream Co., 37 
Ohio App. 42, 46, 174 N.E. 18, 19, it was stated 
that the intervention of a responsible human 
agency between the defendant's alleged wrong-
ful act and the injury complained of did not 
absolve the defendant from liability if his neg-
ligence and that of the intervening human agency 
co-operated in bringing about the injury. In 
Pugh v. Akron-Chicago Transportation Co., 64 
Ohio App. 479, 486, 28 N.E. 2d 1015, 1019, 
1020, it was said again that to relieve a person 
from the consequences of his negligence it was 
not enough that the negligent act or omission of 
another was nearest in the order of events to 
the injury nor that without it the injury would 
not have occurred; that to have this effect it must 
have been the efficient, independent and self-
producing cause, disconnected from the negli-
gence of the first person; and that if the inter-
vening event was one which was not entirely 
improbable, and that the defendant's negligence 
was an essential link in the chain of causation, 
the causal connection between the defendant's 
negligence and the plaintiff's damage was not 
broken." (Emphasis supplied). 
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In line with both the Utah and Pennsylvania dec1 
sions on the subject and the overwhelming authorih 
of the other jurisdictions, Prosser, in his work on tor\.\, 
Third Edition, page 687, S 98, states the general ru], 
as follows, to wit: 
"The conclusion seems to be that any perso11 
furnishing a chattel for a use in which he has:, 
business interest may be liable for his negligenct 
to anyone who may reasonably be expected (,, 
be in the vicinity of its probable use. 
Occasionally in such cases it has been held tha! 
the duty of the person supplied to inspect tht 
chattel himself relieves the supp lier of liability 
because there is 'superseding negligence'. Bui 
as in the case of a seller, most courts have held 
that his failure to make such inspection is within 
the foreseeable risk, and does not excuse the 
supplier." (Emphasis supplied). 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
only logical inference permissible from the evidence, the 
court's instructions and the jury's answers to inter· 
rogatories, is that the negligence of defendant Shur!· 
leff & Andrews was a proximate cause of the deaths 
complained of. Milligan v. Capi,tol Furniture Co., 
supra. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUBJ\tIIT THE ISSUE OF BREACH OF "\VAR· 
RANTY TO THE JURY. 
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Though plaintiffs strongly contend that they are 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law by reason 
of the jury's answers to the special interrogatories 
finding the defendant guilty of negligence, the court 
unduly restricted the plaintiff's theory of the case by 
refusing to submit to the jury the question of breach 
of express and implied warranties. At the outset, it is 
conceded by plaintiffs that even had the issue of breach 
of warranty been submitted to the jury, if the causation 
questions had been submitted in the same form as they 
were in the negligence issue, supported by the same 
erroneous causation instruction, the jury's answers no 
doubt would have been the same. 
Nevertheless, it is established law of this juris-
diction that in a lease for hire, a warranty will be im-
plied that the property is reasonably fit for the purpose 
for which it was hired or leased. Acme Crane Rental 
v. Ideal Cement, 14 Utah 2d 300, 383, P.2d 487. (Plain-
tiffs' Requested Instruction No. 3, R. 145). Further-
more, the evidence was undisputed that the defendant 
expressly warranted to decedent's employer that the 
crane was fit for general crane purposes. (R. 322) 
(Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 4, R.146). 
The trial court apparently removed the warranty 
issues from the case on the basis that there was no 
privity of contract between the defendant and plain-
tiffs' decedents. (R .. 546). Though this court has not 
passed upon the necessity of privity of contract in 
a personal injury case, it has become an established 
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doctrine in leading jurisdictions faced with the issue 
that privity of contract is not an essential to a clailll 
for breach of warranty, or that the manufacturer or 
supp lier of chattels is strictly liable in tort to those 
injured by its dangerous instrumentality. See Hcn-
ninysen v. Bloomfield JJ-lotors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 
A.2d 69, 75 ALR 2d 1; Continental Copper & Steel, 
Inc. v. Cornelius, 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. '581: 
Graha1n v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.:M 
413; Spence v. Three Rivers Builders Co., 353 Mich, 
120, 90 N.\V. 2d 873; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Harnrnond, 
269 F.2d 501 ( CCA 10) ; Brown v. Globe Laboratories, 
165 Neb. 138, 84 N.\V. 2d 151; Rogers v. Toni Home 
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612; 
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 
A.2d 568; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn, 
App. 438, 338 S.\V. 2d 655; Goldberg v. Kollsman 
Instrument Co., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81; 
Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884; 
Spada v. Stauffer, 195 F. Supp. 819, (D. Ore., '61); 
Hart v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp, 
817, (N.D. Ind. '63); State Parm Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Anderson Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 
N.\V. 2d 449; Suvada v. White Motor Co., ____ N.E. 
2d .... , (Ill., :May 20, 1965); Morrow v. Caloric Ap-
pliance Corp., 372 S.\V. 2d 41, (l\Io., '63); Simpson v. 
Logan JJ-lotor Co., 192 A.2d 122, (D.C. Ct. App., '63): 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 59 Cal. 2d 
67, 377 P.2d 897;Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 
A.C. 245, 391 P.2d 168. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT COM_MITTED PREJUDI-
l'L\.L ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JCRY \\TITH RESPECT TO THE DOC-
THINE OF LOANED SERVANT. 
The court refused to instruct the jury as requested 
by plaintiffs in their proposed instructions numbered 
12 through 17. (R. 154-159). The evidence is undis-
puted that the men who actually last connected the 
jib to the boom were _l\lessrs. IIolmes and Pilling, who, 
though at the time, were on the Arch Dam payroll, 
were actually long time Shurtleff & Andrews employees 
seut to the Arch Dam site by Shurtleff & Andrews 
for the purpose of maintaining, operating and caring 
for Shurtleff & Andrews equipment, including the 
crane that failed and killed the decedents. (R. 274, 
:275, 292, 293). If the jury had been instructed, as 
requested, that these men could be found to be the 
agents of the defendant despite their limited control 
by the third party defendant, the apparent inconsistency 
with respect to the jury answers to causation most likely 
would not have occurred. That is to say, the jury, with-
out the loaned servant instructions, might well haYe 
concluded that Holmes and PiJling could only be the 
employees of Arch Dam, and that therefore, under 
erroneous Instruction No. 24, Arch Dam's failure to 
inspect, as a matter of law, was superseding negligence; 
whereas in fact, under proper instructions, the claimed 
superseding negligence would have been found to be 
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the continuing negligence of defendant Shurtleff & 
Andrews, through its employees Holmes and Pilling. 
It is well established that a person may be an 
agent of more than one employer, as was the case here. 
See Restatement of Agency 2d, §§ 226, 227; Rock,y 
Mountain Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 
P.2d 448. 
CONCLUSION 
It is earnestly urged that plaintiffs are entitled to 
entry of judgment as a matter of law for the damages 
found by the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Delbert M. Draper, Jr. 
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Dated: July 12, 1965. 
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